An Error of Judgment once again, or an abiding interest in Demobilizing the Oromo Public??
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I have closely listened to Jawar Mohammed’s recent interviews and public statements. Quite appropriately, Jawar had some strongly worded criticisms for Abiy and his regime. I think he should be lauded for that. I acknowledge that, although it is a shame that it took him so long to say what he is saying now.
More importantly, it is really a shame that despite the delay to utter these words of criticism (and despite the many errors of judgement in trusting Abiy (as opposed to Lemma), his interviews and—judging from the title for now—the book do not acknowledge these errors, take responsibility for them, and show remorse or express regret.
The title of the book (“Hin Gaabbu”) and the statements he made in the BBC interviews so far say only as much.
I am not interested in his remorse or regrets as these are irrelevant sentiments in politics. Nor do I want to come in judgment to say, “How on earth did you change course after coming to Addis and start supporting the same Abiy that we had both been criticising initially?” as (we have long debated this in 2019 and) the answer to this question is now inconsequential at any rate.
What is more intriguing and perhaps more consequential for his political career in the future is what he says about:
a) armed struggle (or rather its futility); and
b) his decision not to engage (so far) in peaceful struggle that he normally is vocal about.
Regarding armed struggle, he said it is a futile exercise. He insists that it is doomed to fail (“nu hin baasu”). The reason it is doomed to fail is because, he says, the people (“all peoples, the Oromo, the Amhara, and even the people in Tigray”) have rejected it. In Afaan Oromoo, he says “uummatni qabsoo karaa qawwee ifateet jira.” When, where, and how they rejected it, he doesn’t discuss. Nor does he bother to marshal his evidence for this.
(There are of course many questions one can pose to Jawar: regarding the armed movement in ANRS: isn’t it the Amhara people that is fully supporting Fanno and making the ANRS totally ungovernable? Haven’t the army generals and the Region’s administrators repeatedly admitted this already?
Regarding the armed resistance in Oromia: Isn’t it the Oromo people who helped raise the OLA whose members are now said to be close to or over a hundred thousand strong?
Regarding Tigray: Wasn’t it the People of Tigray as a whole, both at home and abroad, that stood behind the TDF and eventually forced Abiy into negotiating a ceasefire agreement? Do we need an evidence stronger than Tigray to show that only an armed resistance can prevail over a genocidal fascist regime? Have they not showed this by effectively reversing the invasion and subduing Abiy into an internationally brokered negotiation?
In contrast, have Jawar’s own (and others’) many calls for Abiy to negotiate for peace ever yielded any meaningful result? Why was Abiy more amenable to negotiating with the armed groups but never with the political parties that pursue the so called “peaceful struggle” method as a tactic?
I can go on listing such questions, but let me halt it here for now.
The more intriguing part is how he actually explained why peaceful struggle is absolutely impossible in today’s Ethiopia. Regarding peaceful struggle, this is what Jawar had to say: “In a country where people like Batte Urgessa are subjected to assassinations, for us to call for public meetings and organise the people to engage in peaceful political action is to expose the mass to regime’s murderous instincts.” (Rough translation, mine.)
This statement is intriguing because if one says peaceful struggle is impossible (because Abiy will stage a mass murder), how can Jawar then come back to suggest that only peaceful struggle yields success?
If one says that “armed struggle is futile” (because, according to Jawar, the people have rejected it), then, what other options (strategies) of resistance is he going to adopt to challenge Abiy?
