The Heideggerian critique of modernity culminates in his rejection of any political subjectivism, which later comes to be viewed as any ideology complacent with the latest versions of western metaphysics and its variants. Heidegger's critique, although different in method, is reminiscent of the Schmittian discourse on political romanticism and its subjectivistic roots in early modern occasionalism. But, in many aspects, the Schmittian critique is politically more relevant than Heidegger's later cryptic insights that grounds his new political in the questioning of being and the possibility of a new beginning, an approach which is tantamount to subordinating the political to the 'theophanic’.
One may argue that the two thinkers are totally different in aims and methods. A Heideggerian will probably argue that Schmitt’s thought on the political is another variant of modern subjectivism, and that its volkish tendency is another attempt to ground the political in a super-political will à la Nietzsche. A Schmittian may respond that the very attempt to ground the political in a philosophical form of self-examination à la Aristophanes’ Socrates is politically self-defeating and even dangerous.
Few today would deny the powerfulness of the Heideggerian critique. In a world in which the destructive tendencies of machination and calculation are more apparent than ever before, Heidegger's philosophy is an urgent necessity. Albeit that only reluctantly the two critiques can compromise certain notions, given their radicality and methodical differences, the Schmittian discourse on the political can provide radical insights on the limits of Heidegger’s later poetical contemplations on the political.
And likewise, Heidegger's critique can provide a deeper philosophical insight that may allow redeeming the Schmittian notions from their volkish odds and rejuvenate the discourse of the political, and more importantly, it can free the ‘national’ from the nationalism of modernity. But without a rigorous analysis of the thinkers and an emphasis on their profound differences, any attempt to establish a dialogue between the two will undermine its consistency and fall into arbitrariness, because the two kinds of thinking are not of the same sort, although their concerns converge on various issues.
Schmitt's political philosophy tries to capture the overarching levels of intensities and conflicts that result in political associations and dissociations on the concrete political levels, while Heidegger's project is mainly concerned with the meaning of being and how things come to be given in the first place. A possible dialogue can be guided by an attempt to focus on the relations of the 'political', i.e. the condition of concrete politics, outside the metaphysics of will.
This approach, lest a repeat of the romanticist impasse, should not be characterized by a poetical passivity, nor should it try to deprioritize the will from the political horizon altogether. Rather, its main goal must be disentangling the notions necessary for politics from the metaphysics of will and freeing the sources of political association from the logic of calculation and manipulation.
Two things make Heidegger's philosophy so annoying to every novice; the inversion of the Aristotelian prioritization of actuality over potentiality; the transformation of thinking from the present-indicative to the future-subjunctive. Understanding Heidegger's philosophy mainly requires developing an ability to think the mutual presencing and abscencing through time. Only in Time, the realm of the possible gain primacy over the realm of the actual. For Heidegger this Time is the bedrock of our existence.
One may argue that the two thinkers are totally different in aims and methods. A Heideggerian will probably argue that Schmitt’s thought on the political is another variant of modern subjectivism, and that its volkish tendency is another attempt to ground the political in a super-political will à la Nietzsche. A Schmittian may respond that the very attempt to ground the political in a philosophical form of self-examination à la Aristophanes’ Socrates is politically self-defeating and even dangerous.
Few today would deny the powerfulness of the Heideggerian critique. In a world in which the destructive tendencies of machination and calculation are more apparent than ever before, Heidegger's philosophy is an urgent necessity. Albeit that only reluctantly the two critiques can compromise certain notions, given their radicality and methodical differences, the Schmittian discourse on the political can provide radical insights on the limits of Heidegger’s later poetical contemplations on the political.
And likewise, Heidegger's critique can provide a deeper philosophical insight that may allow redeeming the Schmittian notions from their volkish odds and rejuvenate the discourse of the political, and more importantly, it can free the ‘national’ from the nationalism of modernity. But without a rigorous analysis of the thinkers and an emphasis on their profound differences, any attempt to establish a dialogue between the two will undermine its consistency and fall into arbitrariness, because the two kinds of thinking are not of the same sort, although their concerns converge on various issues.
Schmitt's political philosophy tries to capture the overarching levels of intensities and conflicts that result in political associations and dissociations on the concrete political levels, while Heidegger's project is mainly concerned with the meaning of being and how things come to be given in the first place. A possible dialogue can be guided by an attempt to focus on the relations of the 'political', i.e. the condition of concrete politics, outside the metaphysics of will.
This approach, lest a repeat of the romanticist impasse, should not be characterized by a poetical passivity, nor should it try to deprioritize the will from the political horizon altogether. Rather, its main goal must be disentangling the notions necessary for politics from the metaphysics of will and freeing the sources of political association from the logic of calculation and manipulation.
Two things make Heidegger's philosophy so annoying to every novice; the inversion of the Aristotelian prioritization of actuality over potentiality; the transformation of thinking from the present-indicative to the future-subjunctive. Understanding Heidegger's philosophy mainly requires developing an ability to think the mutual presencing and abscencing through time. Only in Time, the realm of the possible gain primacy over the realm of the actual. For Heidegger this Time is the bedrock of our existence.